供應鏈上下游企業(yè)商業(yè)秘密沖突演化機理研究

打開文本圖片集

中圖分類號：F270 文獻標識碼：A 文章編號：1672-7312（2025）04-0418-11

Abstract： In order to deeply explore the conflict evolution mechanism among the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain，and reduce the occurrence of enterprise leaks，based on the evolutionary game theory，this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between external regulators and upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain， explores the strategy adjustment mechanism of the three participants from the perspective of the whole life cycle of conflict governance，and analyzes the influence of each influencing factor on the evolutionary results through numerical simulation.The results show that： In the initial and adjustment stage of conflict governance，the external regulator always strictly supervises to promote benign cooperation among enterprises，and the core enterprises graduall adjust the strategy from leakage to non-disclosure; in the stable stage，the external party reduces intervention，and the enterprises are stable in non-disclosure intention. Improve the degree of trust，non-disclosureincentive coefficient，disclosure risk coefficient，increase the intensityof punishment is an effective way to avoid enterprise infringement of business secrets.The lower management cost and more significant social effect make the external regulators more willing to continue to make effrts in the supervision.Therefore，the research provides beneficial theoretical support and deci;ion-making basis for the business secret conflict of supply chain cooperative enterprises.

Key words： supply chain collaboration; conflict of trade secrets; disclosure; knowledge sharing; evolutionary game

0 引言

隨著知識經(jīng)濟的崛起，企業(yè)的競爭格局發(fā)生了深刻變化，傳統(tǒng)的技術競爭逐漸演變?yōu)榧夹g知識與資源的綜合競爭。（剩余14003字）